Russian Preparations for Reduced Foreign Military Presence in?Afghanistan
Speaking at?the West Point Military Academy on?December?1, 2009, a?year after his election for his first term, President Barack Obama unveiled the new U.S. strategy in?Afghanistan. The plan was to?seize the initiative from the Taliban through a?temporary troop surge, and inflict a?decisive military defeat on?the adversary. In?parallel, the international coalition would train up?Afghanistan?s own national security forces in?order to?facilitate a?phased pullout of?the ISAF troops starting in?mid-2011. The security remit would be?handed over to?the Afghan government, and by?late 2014 the numbers of?foreign troops still remaining in?the country would be?below 10,000, most of?them American military advisors and specialists.
It?is?safe to?say that history is?repeating itself, with some fairly minor differences. The rapid drawdown of?American and coalition troops, with the remaining forces providing support rather than doing the bulk of?the fighting, is?eerily reminiscent of?the Soviet troop pullout from Afghanistan in?1989. In?the short term, the consequences for the Hamid Karzai government could be?the same as?they had proved for the Najibullah regime.
The problem and its consequences
If?the Taliban-led opposition comes to?power in?Afghanistan, the country will once again become a?source of?regional instability, fed by?a?combination of?international terrorism, religious extremism, fundamentalism, and drug trafficking.
Compounded by?internal problems (such as?ethnic rivalry, social tensions, competition for water resources and hydrocarbons, rivalry for regional leadership, and the power transfer problem), these external factors could well trigger a?military-political crisis in?the neighboring Central Asian states, in?a?repeat of?the situation back in?the 1990s.
The greatest potential for conflict is?in?the densely populated Fergana Valley, which lies on?the border between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Instability could also spread to?western Kazakhstan and eastern Tajikistan. There is?a?high risk of?these territories being infiltrated after 2015 by?irregular forces of?the Taliban?s and Al?Qaeda?s allies, such?as:
All these groups may well try to?depose the Central Asian regimes and turn these secular countries into some kind of?a?medieval caliphate.
One indication of?the likelihood of?such a?scenario is?the frequency of?armed clashes with drug couriers on?the Tajik-Afghan border. There were 17?in?the whole of?2012, and as?many as?30?in?just the first nine months of?2013.
Ways of?addressing the problem and minimizing its consequences
The united forces of?the Taliban, Al?Qaeda and their Jihadist allies in?the region are opposed by?an?international coalition whose core consists of?Russia and the Central Asian members of?the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. China and Uzbekistan are on?the periphery of?that coalition. They and the five CSTO states are fellow members of?the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?? but Tashkent and Beijing pursue their own course and have their own interests in?the regional security situation.
Obviously, Russia has a?lot to?lose from a?possible breakdown of?fragile regional stability in?Central Asia. That is?why Moscow must play the leading role in?averting a?military-political crisis or?minimizing its consequences. The measures Russia must take to?that end can be?divided into two categories: military-political, and military-technical.
A?revision of?the strategy of?U.S. military presence in?Afghanistan coincided with the
Given that irregular forces constitute the main potential military threat in?the region, there is?a?particular emphasis on?special operations in?the Central Asian theater. For example, during the Soviet campaign in?Afghanistan, Army special operations units (Spetsnaz) were used in?up?to?
Repelling attacks by?irregular forces would require rapid deployment of?Russian troops in?the theater. The Russian military leadership is?therefore considering the possibility of?setting up?a?special Rapid Reaction Force, perhaps in?the form of?a?fifth OSK with a?universal geographical remit. The concept of?a?Rapid Reaction Force (SBR) was presented to?the Russian military-political leadership in?early 2013, and received its overall approval. The core of?the SBR will consist of?the Airborne Troops (VDV). The VDV units assigned for missions in?the Central OSK area of?responsibility are the 98th Guard Airborne Assault Division and the 31st Independent Guard Airborne Assault Brigade. At?present the VDV service is?implementing a?set of?organizational and structural measures to?bolster the fighting ability of?the core of?the future SBR force. As?part of?these measures, three independent airborne assault brigades that previously took their orders from the military district HQs have now been subordinated to?the VDV?HQ, and there are plans to?create a?fourth brigade. These units? reconnaissance companies are being bolstered to?the size of?battalions, and independent regiments (special-operations and communications) are becoming brigades. The regiments are being given army aviation companies; at?some point in?the future the VDV service will have one or?two army aviation brigades. The VDV units are also being given their own UAV?companies, which will eventually become UAV?squadrons. Finally, there are plans for each VDV division to?get a?third airborne (or?airborne assault) regiment; they now have two such regiments apiece.
As?part of?the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) arrangements, Russia has contributed to?the new regional and inter-regional forces. The regional force includes permanent combat readiness troops provided by?the CSTO members to?the Central Asian Region?s Collective Rapid Deployment Force (KSBR TsAR). The KSBR was set up?on?May?25, 2001 in?accordance with a?decision by?the presidents of?Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Its numerical strength currently stands at?about 5,000 (10?battalions). It?has more than 300 tanks and armored combat vehicles, 10?Su-25?aircraft, and 14?Mi-8MTV-1?helicopters. The force?s time-to-deployment is?up?to?5?days. Essentially, the KSBR is?an?equivalent of?NATO?s Immediate Response Force?/ NATO Response Force (NRF). The KSBR has held the Rubezh comprehensive joint exercise every year since 2004.
Table?1. Composition of?the CSTO?s KSBR TsAR rapid deployment force
Source: CSTO website, media reports
The inter-regional force consists of?troops provided by?the CSTO members for the Collective Fast Deployment Force (KSOR), which was set up?on?February?4, 2009 by?a?CSTO Collective Security Council decision. The numerical strength of?the KSOR force is?about 20,000, including 17,000 of?permanent combat readiness troops and 3,000?FSSN special operations units provided by?the CSTO countries? interior ministries, national security agencies, and civil defense services. The entire KSOR force is?air-mobile. Its time to?deployment depends on?the particular unit?s country of?origin; the troops provided by?Russia can be?deployed within 24?to?72?hours. The KSOR force is?the equivalent of?NATO?s Rapid Deployable Corps?/ High Readiness Forces (HRF).
The KSOR operational, combat and special training program includes:
The establishment of?the CSTO Collective Forces (KS) was announced in?late 2012. Measures to?establish the?KS force include:
Table?2. Composition of?the CSTO KSOR force
Source: CSTO website, media reports
As?part of?the Russian defense procurement program, over the past five years units subordinated to?the Central OSK have taken delivery of?the following weaponry: BTR-82A and BTR-80A armored personnel carriers; 2S9-1M Nona-SM self-propelled 120mm gun-mortar systems with tracked chassis and 2S23 Nona-SVK gun-mortar systems with wheeled chassis; Granat-2 and Tipchak-K UAVs; Mustang and Motovoz multirole trucks (made by?KamAZ and UralAZ, respectively); the Akatsiya universal field automation sets (?field Internet?); new-generation digital communication systems; the Volynets digital topography complex; the Korshun contactless explosive device detectors (to?replace the old IMP-2 and IMP-S metal detectors); the Dublon personal protection suits for mine clearance specialists; and the Pecheneg-N 7.62mm general-purpose machine guns (to?replace the PKM). The Central OSK?s artillery systems have been upgraded with new automated targeting and fire control systems, which have improved firing accuracy by?
The VDV units are being armed with the new BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles; BTR-MDM tracked APCs and BTR-82A wheeled APCs; Tigr-M and Tayfun armored MRAP vehicles; 2S25 Sprut-SD 125mm self-propelled anti-tank guns; quadricycles; a?new self-propelled anti-tank missile system; new self-propelled 120mm and 152mm artillery; the Andromeda-A automated control system; the Navodchik-2?UAVs; the Leyer-2 radio-electronic warfare system; and KamAZ-43501 multirole trucks (to?replace the old GAZ-66). VDV troops have also entered into service and are taking deliveries of?the new D-10, D-12 and Arbalet parachutes, as?well as?the Shelf airdrop system.
Special operations units have received the new Grusha, Navodchik-2 and Zastava reconnaissance and target designation UAVs. Several advanced communication, navigation and search systems have been trialed and will soon enter into service with the armed forces. By?January 2016 advanced new systems should make up?30?per cent of?all the hardware in?service with Russian troops.
The 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Command, which is?part of?the Center OSK, has upgraded its Su-24M?bombers. They have been retrofitted with the new Gefest SVP-24 targeting and navigation system. The bombers? range has increased substantially thanks to?the installation of?the new UPAZ standard refueling pods, which enable the aircraft to?refuel each other in?
The capability of?the Russian Military Transport Aviation service will be?improved substantially by?the new Il-476 military transports. At?this moment, the service?s 40?transport aircraft can airlift a?single airborne regiment (without one battalion). Following the addition of?the Il-476 transports to?the fleet, by?
The Caspian Flotilla is?formally a?part of?the Southern OSK, but it?is?also used to?support the Caspian flank of?the Central OSK?s 2nd Guard Army. The flotilla has recently taken delivery of?the Dagestan, a?Project 11661K light frigate; two Project 21630?gunboats; two Project 21631 small guided-missile corvettes; and two amphibious landing boats (Project 11770 and Project 21820). By?2015 the Caspian Flotilla will also receive another three Project 21631 guided missile corvettes. The Project 11661K and Project 21631 missile ships are armed with the Kalibr-NK cruise missile system, which has a?range of?up?to?2,600?km against ground targets. By?2020 the flotilla will take delivery of?up?to?16?new combat ships and boats.
As?part of?cooperation in?the CSTO framework, Russia supplies fairly large amounts of?weaponry to?three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The arms trade between Russia and Kazakhstan was worth 141m dollars in?
Russia has announced that it?will provide 1.1bn dollars worth of?military assistance to?Kyrgyzstan in?
Russia has provided an?estimated 411m dollars worth of?military assistance to?Tajikistan in?
Every year up?to?1,000 servicemen from the CSTO countries enroll on?various training courses at?the Russian MoD schools and academies.
Likely military scenarios
The more likely scenario of?Russian-led military action in?Central Asia includes special operations to?interdict and neutralize irregular forces ranging in?strength from
The less likely scenario is?the participation of?CSTO allies in?a?local or?regional war?? including operations to?repel an?attack by?regular armed forces of?a?neighboring country. One of?the possible adversaries under this scenario is?Uzbekistan, which aspires to?the role of?regional leader, and which has various ongoing disputes with every single Russian ally in?the region. Besides, the country is?politically unstable and is?facing a?problematic power transfer period. In?such a?scenario, we?cannot rule out a?rapid escalation of?the potential conflict to?a?large-scale war, with the entire available range of?conventional weapons brought to?bear. In?such a?situation, deploying the KSBR and KSOR forces will not be?enough; Russia and its main ally, Kazakhstan, will have to?initiate a?much larger troop deployment in?the Central Asian region.
The security situation in?the Central Asian states is?very likely to?deteriorate sharply in?the foreseeable future.
Once the ISAF drawdown has been completed, the armed opposition in?Afghanistan has a?significant chance of?achieving a?complete or?partial victory (with the country splitting in?half in?the latter scenario). After coming to?power in?Afghanistan, the Taliban and their allies might well set their sights on?Central Asia.
Given the fragility of?the Central Asian states, a?combination of?internal and external factors of?instability could plunge the region into chaos, with outbreaks of?mass rioting degenerating into armed conflicts. The humanitarian consequences of?such conflicts would be?grave.
In?the event of?a?sharp deterioration in?Tajikistan or?Kyrgyzstan, Russia is?likely to?intervene on?a?fairly limited scale. But if?Kazakhstan is?in?danger, Russia will launch a?full-scale intervention.
Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)